It is not my intention here to equate this computational turn with the digital humanities per se. Although the latter is sometimes known as humanities computing, or as a transition between the "traditional humanities" and humanities computing (Meeks 2010) , what has come to be called the digital humanities and this computational turn in the humanities should not be perceived as being equivalent to one another. Instead, I want to emphasize the importance of maintaining a distinction between them, especially if we are to develop a rigorous understanding of what the humanities can become in an era of networked digital information machines. So far (and as we shall see in Part II), the traffic in this computational turn has been predominately one-way. As the term implies, it has been mainly concerned with exploring what direct, practical uses computer science can be put to in the humanities, in terms of performing operations on sets, flows and networks of data so large that, in the words of the NEH et al. Digging Into Data Challenge, "they can be processed only using computing what computer science has to offer the humanities, however, is the question of what the humanities -in both their digital and traditional guises (assuming the two can be distinguished in this way, which is by no means certain, as we shall see) -have to offer computer science; and, beyond that, what the humanities themselves can bring to the understanding of computing and the shaping of the digital. Do the humanities really need to draw quite so heavily on computer science to develop a sense of what they can be in the age of new media and big data? Together with a computational turn in the humanities, might we not also benefit from more of a humanities -and, as I shall point to in my conclusion, perhaps even post-humanities -turn in our understanding of the computational and the digital?
Poster's argument about the relation to the machine in computer science being one of misrecognition takes on added importance in the light of such questions. It suggests that as a field computer science is not necessarily the best equipped to understand itself and its own founding object, let alone help those in the humanities with their relation to computing and the digital. In fact, counter-intuitive as it may seem, if what we are looking for is an appreciation of what the humanities can become in an era of networked digital information machines and data-driven scholarship, we may be better advised seeking assistance elsewhere, other than primarily with computing science and engineering, science and technology, or even science in general. One almost hesitates to suggest this in the current political climate when government, research council and private funding in the UK is focused on the STEM subjects (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) -although it may be important to do so for just this reason -but perhaps we should turn to the literary critics, philosophers and theorists of the humanities right from the start.
Thirty years ago the philosopher Jean-François Lyotard showed how science, lacking the resources to legitimate itself as true, had, since its beginnings with Plato, relied for its legitimacy on precisely the kind of knowledge it did not even consider to be knowledge: nonscientific narrative knowledge. Specifically, science legitimated itself by producing a discourse called philosophy. It was philosophy's role to generate a discourse of legitimation for science. Lyotard proceeded to define as modern any science that legitimated itself in this way by means of a metadiscourse that explicitly appealed to a grand narrative of some sort: the life of the spirit, the Enlightenment, progress, modernity, the emancipation of humanity, the realisation of the Idea. What makes Lyotard's analysis so significant with respect to the emergence of the digital humanities and the computational turn is that his ambition was not to position philosophy as being able to tell us as much, if not more, about science than science itself could. It was rather to emphasize that, in a process of transformation that had been taking place since at least the end of the 1950s, such long-standing metanarratives of legitimation had themselves become obsolete. So what happens to science when the philosophical metanarratives that legitimate it are no longer credible? Lyotard's answer, at least in part, was that science (or a certain stabilized, ideologically "accepted" version of it) was increasing its connection to society, especially the instrumentality and functionality of society (as opposed to a notion of public service, say) (Lyotard 1986, 63) .
2 Science was doing so by helping to legitimate and "augment" the power of States, companies and multinational corporations by optimizing the "global relationship between input and output," between what is put into the social system and what is got out of it, in order to get more from less (46, 11) .
It is at this point that we return directly to the subject of computing. For Lyotard, writing in 1979, technological transformations in research and the transmission of acquired learning in the most highly developed societies, including the widespread use of computers and databases and the "miniaturization and commercialization of machines," were already in the process of exteriorizing knowledge in relation to the "knower" (4). He demonstrates how this general transformation and exteriorization is leading to a major alteration in the status and nature of knowledge: away from a concern with "the true, the just, or the beautiful, etc". (44), with ideals (48), with knowledge as an end in itself (5, 50); and precisely toward a concern with improving the social system's performance, its efficiency (xxiv). Thirty years later we do indeed find numerous discourses in the sciences taken up with exteriorizing knowledge and information in order to achieve "the best possible performance" by eliminating delays and inefficiencies, and by solving technical problems (77 (Suber 2009 ). Even the data created in the course of scientific research is being made freely and openly available on the Internet for others to use, analyse and build upon.
Known as Open Data, this initiative is motivated by more than an awareness data is the main research output in many fields. In the words of another of the leading advocates for open access, publishing data online on an open basis bestows it with a "vastly increased utility:" digital data sets are "easily passed around;" they are "more easily reused," reanalysed and checked for accuracy and validity; and they contain more "opportunities for educational and commercial exploitation" (Swan 2009 ).
In a further move in this direction, all seven Public Library of Science (PLoS) open access journals now provide a broad range of article level metrics and indicators relating to usage data on an open basis. PLoS has positioned this programme as enabling science scholars to assess "research articles on their own merits rather than on the basis of the journal (and its impact factor) where the work happens to be published," and they encourage readers to carry out their own analyses of this open data (Patterson 2009 ). Yet it is difficult not to see articlelevel metrics as also being part of the wider process of transforming knowledge and learning into "quantities of information;" quantities that are produced more to be exchanged, marketed and sold -for example, by individual academics to their departments, institutions, funders and governments in the form of indicators of "quality" and "impact" -than for their "'usevalue'" (Lyotard 1986, 4, 5) .
Certainly, the current requirement to have visibility, to show up in the metrics, to be measurable, encourages researchers to publish as much and as frequently as they can.
Consequently, the peer-reviewed academic journal article has been positioned by some as having now assumed "a single central value, not that of bringing something new to the field but that of assessing the person's research, with a view to hiring, promotion, funding, and, more and more, avoiding termination" (Kempf 2010 ). In such circumstances "it is not hard to visualize learning circulating along the same lines as money, instead of for its 'educational' value or political (administrative, diplomatic, military) importance" (Lyotard 1986, 6) . Just as money has become a source of virtual value and speculation in the era of American-led neoliberal global finance capital, so too has education, research and publication.
Of course, such discourses around openness, efficiency and utility are not confined to the sciences -or even the university. There are also wider political initiatives, dubbed 'Open In what seems to be almost the reverse of the situation we saw Lyotard describe, many of those in the humanities do now appear to be looking increasingly to science (and technology and mathematics) -if not always computer science specifically -to provide their research with a degree of legitimacy. This includes some of the field's most radical thinkers. Witness
Franco "Bifo" Berardi's appeal to "the history of modern chemistry on the one hand, and the most recent cognitive theories on the other," for confirmation of the compositionist philosophical hypothesis: "There is no object, no existent, and no person: only aggregates, temporary atomic compositions, figures that the human eye perceives as stable but that are indeed mutational, transient, frayed and indefinable" (Berardi 2009, 121, 120) . It is this hypothesis, derived from Democritus, that Bifo sees as underpinning the methods of both the schizoanalysis of Deleuze and Guattari and the Italian Autonomist Theory on which his own compositionist philosophy is based.
This scientific turn in the humanities has been attributed by some to a crisis of confidence brought about, if not by the lack of credibility of the humanities' metanarratives of legitimation exactly, then at least in part by the "imperious attitude" of the sciences. It is an attitude that has led the latter to colonize the humanists' space in the form of biomedicine, neuroscience, theories of cognition and so on (Kagan 2009, 227) . From this perspective, the turn toward computing appears as just the latest manifestation of, and response to, this crisis of confidence in the humanities. Can we go even further, however, and ask: is it evidence that certain parts of the humanities are attempting to increase their connection to society; 3 and to the efficiency, instrumentality and functionality of society especially? What are we to make of the fact that such a turn toward computing is gaining momentum at a time when the UK government is emphasizing the importance of the STEMs and withdrawing support and At the very least, a question can be raised regarding the extent to which the take up of practical techniques and approaches from computing science is providing some areas of the humanities with a means of defending and refreshing themselves in an era of global economic crisis and severe cuts to higher education, through the transformation of their knowledge and learning into (ideologically acceptable) quantities of information -deliverables. But the computational turn can also be positioned as an event created to justify such a move on the part of certain elements within the humanities (Frabetti 2010) . In which case it might be advisable to use a different term than digital humanities if we do not wish to simply go along with the current movement away from what remains resistant to a general culture of measurement and calculation. For the idea of both the computational turn and the digital humanities seems to imply that, thanks to the development of a new generation of powerful computers and digital tools, the humanities have somehow become digital, or are in the process of becoming digital (Frabetti 2010 ). Yet one of the things I am attempting to show here by drawing on the thought of Lyotard and others is that the digital is not something that can now be added to the humanities -for the simple reason that the (supposedly pre-digital)
humanities can be seen to have already had an understanding of, and engagement with, computing and the digital.
Certainly, something that is particularly noticeable about many instances of this turn to datadriven scholarship -especially after decades when the humanities have been heavily marked by a variety of critical theories: Marxist, psychoanalytic, post-colonialist, post-Marxist -is just how difficult they find it to understand computing and the digital as much more than tools, techniques and resources, and thus how naive and lacking in meaningful critique they There is a long history of critical engagement within the humanities with ideas of the visual, the image, the spectacle, the spectator and so on: not just in critical theory, but also in literary studies, cultural studies, women's studies, queer studies, media studies, film and television Interestingly, Scheinfeldt suggests that the problem of theory, or the lack of it, may actually be a matter of scale and timing:
It expects something of the scale of humanities scholarship which I'm not sure is true anymore: that a single scholar-nay, every scholar-working alone will, over the course of his or her lifetime ... make a fundamental theoretical advance to the field.
Increasingly, this expectation is something peculiar to the humanities. ... it required the work of a generation of mathematicians and observational astronomers, gainfully employed, to enable the eventual "discovery" of Neptune… Since the scientific revolution, most theoretical advances play out over generations, not single careers.
There is just too much lab work to be done and data to analyzed for each person to be pointed at the end point. (Scheinfeldt, 2012b) Notice how theory is again being marginalized in favour of an emphasis on STEM, and the adoption of expectations and approaches associated with mathematicians and astronomers in particular.
None of this is to deny we should experiment with the new tools, methods and materials that digital media technologies create and make possible, including those drawn from computer science, in order to bring new forms of Foucauldian dispositifs, or what Bernard Stiegler refers to as hypomnemata (that is mnemonics) into play (2010, (167) (168) . Still, there is something intriguing about the way in which many defenders of the turn toward computational tools and methods in the humanities evoke a sense of time in relation to theory.
Take the argument -apparent in the emphasis Scheinfeldt places on scale and timing -that critical and self-reflexive theoretical questions about the use of digital tools and data-led methodologies should be deferred for the time being, lest they have the effect of strangling at birth what could turn out to be a very different form of humanities research before it has had a chance to properly take shape. Viewed in isolation, it can be difficult, if not impossible, to decide whether this particular kind of limitless postponement is serving as an alibi for a naive and rather superficial form of scholarship (Meeks 2010) ; or whether it is indeed acting as a responsible political or ethical opening to the (heterogeneity and incalculability of the) future, including the future of the humanities. After all, the suggestion is that now is not the right time to be making any such decision or judgement, since we cannot yet know how humanists will eventually come to use these tools and data, and thus what data-driven scholarship may or may not turn out to be capable of, critically, politically, theoretically. All of which gives a very different inflection to the view of theoretical critique as being at best inappropriate, and at worst harmful to data-driven scholarship. Even a brief glance at the history of theory's reception in the English-speaking world is sometimes enough to reveal that those who announce its time has not yet come, or is already over, that theory is in decline or even dead, and that we now live in a post-theoretical world, are more often than not endeavouring to keep it at a temporal distance. Positioning their work as either pre-or posttheory in this way in effect grants them permission to continue with their preferred techniques and methodologies for studying culture relatively uncontested (rather than having to ask rigorous, critical and self-reflexive questions about their own practices and justifications for them). Placed in this wider context, far from helping to keep the question concerning the use of digital tools and data-led methodologies in the humanities open, the rejection of criticaltheoretical ideas as untimely can be seen as both moralizing and conservative.
In saying this I am reiterating an argument made by Wendy Brown in the sphere of political
theory. Yet can a similar case not be made with regard to the computational turn in the humanities, to the effect that the "rebuff of critical theory as untimely provides the core matter for the affirmative case for it?" 5 Theory is vital from this point of view, not for conforming to accepted conceptions of political critique that see it primarily in terms of power, ideology, race, ethnicity, gender, class, and so on, but "to contest the very sense of time invoked to declare critique untimely" (Brown 2005, 4) .
PART 2: THE CULTURAL ANALYTICS OF LEV MANOVICH AND THE

SOFTWARE STUDIES INITIATIVE
To think further and in more detail about the relation between data-driven scholarship, theory researchers to fulfil at some unspecified point in the future. "What we need is to have as many people as possible start using these tools --and then we will see what will emerge" (Manovich 2008 Yet how interesting is it that Cultural Analytics should more or less confirm the accepted history of art, rather than offer a significant challenge to that history, or even address it particularly critically (Shanken 2009 )? And how surprising is it, given that the study is based on canonical images taken from that same history?
Far from enabling him to avoid having to answer the kinds of questions often associated with the close reading of a relatively small number of texts that were dominant for so much of the twentieth century, could Manovich's Cultural Analytics approach to art history not here be said to be based on the assumption that such apparently untimely questions have already been answered -to the extent they now appear to be relatively unimportant and unproblematic Cultural Analytics is potentially capable of with regard to broadening the "canon of cultural material under consideration by humanities scholars" and analyzing large sets of cultural data, now and in the future, a number of questions remain (Burdick et al 2012, 41) . For instance, the Cultural Analytics page of the Software Studies Initiative's website describes one of the key goals of Cultural Analytics research as being to "create much more inclusive cultural histories and analysis -ideally taking into account all available cultural objects created in particular cultural area and time period" (Manovich 2009 (Manovich /2012b ). Yet what would all the available cultural objects created in a particular cultural area and time period be? What theory of the cultural object -or cultural area and time period, or indeed culture -is being used to underpin such research? And, again, what types of analysis and questions are being privileged? How are all these images and objects being structured for retrieval and analysis?
What is being left out? (At the very least everything that cannot be so digitized and structured presumably?) And how do such (non)decisions affect the analysis?
For the most part, rather than taking the time to reflect rigorously on such questions and seriously engage with them, Manovich's Cultural Analytics in effect abstracts the (large sets of) visual cultural objects it chooses to work with from the particular historical, social and cultural contexts, practices and sets of relations associated with their production, mediation, interpretation and consumption (the law, politics, the market economy, and so forth), to focus primarily on the formal aspects of their contents and structure of composition (e.g. the color saturation of Time magazine covers). Cultural Analytics proceeds to treat these (large sets of) cultural objects and artefacts as if they constitute more or less identifiable, stable, selfidentical, some might say essentialist forms, which can be analyzed automatically by using "image processing and computer vision techniques" in order "to generate numerical descriptions of their structure and content," thus transforming these (sets of) cultural objects into data (Manovich, 2009a) . This then allows the Cultural Analytics researcher to perform various "new" kinds of operations and procedures borrowed from computing science and software using these numerical descriptions, such as searching, sorting, copying, combining, comparing, correlating, visualizing, graphing, sharing and remixing. In doing so, however, Manovich's Cultural Analytics takes too little account of the constitutive force of its own analysis: the way in which, just as critical theory tells us that the reader of a text is constituted as a subject in and by the very process of reading, so the (large sets of) objects of Cultural Analytics research do not exist outside of and prior to the analysis in any simple or straightforward sense, but are performatively constructed by it in the very process of being analysed, translated into data and operated on, regardless of whether this is done automatically or not. What can variously be understood in terms of the irreducible violence, ambiguity, fictionality or, following the philosopher and quantum physicist Karen Barad (2007), intra-action that is inherent to all analysis, interpretation and mediation, the implications of which the last five decades of critical theory have spent a good deal of time endeavouring to understand and think through: hence theory's interest in writing, literature, poesis and so on.
Indeed, would it be going too far to suggest that, in his desire to develop what he refers to as "new paradigm for the study, teaching and public presentation" of cultural artefacts, Manovich has neglected to pay sufficient attention to taking on and assuming (rather than merely repeating and acting out), the implications of one of the major insights regarding language and technology acquired from twentieth-century theory (2009b)? It is a lesson the latter has been teaching us since at least the work of Heidegger in "The Question Concerning
Technology" (though there are traces as far back as the "first mechanized philosopher"
Nietzsche (Kittler 1999, 200) , and the development of the typewriter); a lesson moreover by now well-known: namely, that it is not just we who speak and act through language and technology, it is also language and technology that speaks and acts through us in a process of co-constitution. What this means is that we need to ask questions about more than how we can control, search, find, access, order, structure, mine, map, visualize, graph, audit, interpret, analyse and assess vast amounts of cultural data through software tools and techniques and approaches drawn from computing science. We also need to devote great care and attention to asking questions about how these software tools and computational techniques and approaches are controlling, searching, finding, accessing, ordering, structuring, mining, mapping, visualizing, graphing, auditing, interpreting, analysing and assessing through, around and as part of us. 7 And thus how they are involved in the process of constituting and organizing our culture and society -and with it our literary and cultural criticism as well as our sense of the humanities, humanists and the human -in the twenty-first century.
All of which points to a key problem with the attempt to shift from an interest in the kind of critical theories that dominated the humanities for so much of the twentieth century to an interest in tools, techniques and methodologies adapted from computer science and related fields. For if we do not explicitly do theory -because we either think we have left it behind or relegated it to some as yet unspecified point in the future -we do not end up not doing theory.
Every methodology contains theory. If we do not explicitly do theory, we end up doing simplistic and uninteresting theory that remains blind to the ways it acts as a relay for other forces, including those that are part of the general movement in contemporary society
Lyotard associated with the widespread use of computers and databases and the exteriorization of knowledge. As we have seen, it is currently a movement toward STEM subjects and away from the humanities; toward a concern to transform knowledge and learning into quantities of information and to legitimate power by optimizing the social system's performance in instrumental, functional terms, and away from questions of what is just, right and true; and toward an emphasis on openness, efficiency and transparency and away, not just from a concern with public service, but also what is capable of disrupting and
disturbing society and what, in remaining resistant to a culture of measurement and calculation, helps to maintain much needed elements of dissensus, dysfunction, ambiguity, conflict, unpredictability, inaccessibility and inefficiency.
In this respect there is a temptation to agree with those who have insisted Manovich's Cultural Analytics is "unconvincing" (Shanken, 2009) . But could we go further? Could we say his data-driven cultural research functions as an alibi for an unthought-out and rather shallow form of humanities scholarship that has itself been colonized by, and "passionately"
imitates, the concerns of scientists, businesses, and government agencies (Manovich 2010b )?
In following "the templates established by the professionals" and marginalizing positions that The second approach was used in humanities fields such as literary studies, art history, film studies, and history… The examples of relevant methods are hermeneutics, participant observation, thick description, semiotics, and close reading. (Manovich 2012a, 461-462) However, Manovich sees the rise of social media in the middle of the 2000s, along with computational tools able to handle extremely large data sets, as making possible a "new paradigm" based on a combination of "quantitative and qualitative approaches" (ibid., 472, 473). Consequently, no longer must we endeavour to chart a third path between these two approaches such as that represented for Manovich by statistics and sampling, enabling researchers as they do to "expand certain types of data about the few into the knowledge about the many," with all the problems attendant on such an expansion (462). Indeed, we do not have to "choose between data size and data depth" at all (462-463). Rather, "'surface is the new depth'" (472) in the sense that:
we can use computers to quickly explore massive visual data sets and then select the objects for closer manual analysis. While computer-assisted examination of massive cultural data sets typically reveals new patterns in this data which even best manual "close reading" would miss -and of course, even an army of humanists will not be able to carefully "close read" massive data sets in the first place -a human is still needed to make sense of these patterns. (468) (469) Encouraged by this line of argument, it is tempting to imagine all we need to do to resolve the situation facing literary and cultural criticism in the twenty-first century is find a means of marrying the quantitative methodologies and cultural analysis characteristic of Manovich's research, along with the necessary "expertise in computer science, statistics, and data mining" he sees humanities researchers as typically lacking (470), with the kind of rigorous theoretical critique and self-reflexivity he maintains should also be a part of any Cultural Analytics study. We should proceed with care, however. For once embarked on this path, we are likely to find ourselves confronted by a variation on a problem I have detailed elsewhere (Hall, 2002) : that it is not necessarily possible to enhance the performative theoretical interpretations that have long been a prominent feature of the humanities with the kind of positivistic, empirical methodologies and "tools of quantitative analysis often found in the hard sciences" (Navas 2009 computers' ability to analyze massive data sets using algorithms we create," cannot be simply combined (Manovich 2012a, 469) . But what it also means is that any rigorous attempt to think these approaches together needs to begin by explicitly recognizing the incommensurable nature of their relation and thematizing it accordingly. We can thus see that far more time and care needs to be spent on how any such communication can be achieved between the respective partners in this impossible relationship than has been devoted to it so far. This is where the lack of rigorous attention on Manovich's part to some of the theories that dominated the humanities for much of the twentieth century is felt most keenly.
For certainly Marxism, post-Marxism, psychoanalysis and deconstruction are in their different ways all capable of providing a potential means, not of reconciling the kind of "deep," close reading and self-reflexive theoretical critique that has been so important to the humanities with the "surface," quantitative analysis and empirical methodologies more readily associated with the sciences and social sciences, but of producing a consciously developed theory of their incompatibility. Such a theory might even be capable of showing how they can both be practiced at the same time, as two incommensurable positions, in an irresolvable yet productive tension, so that the questions, issues and approaches specific to each are capable of generating new findings, insights and realisations in the other -to the point where both of their identities are brought into question. For the process of developing such a theory would involve more than merely negotiating the difficult relationship between the two: co-switching emphasis and attention from one to the other and back again, as appropriate. It would not be a case of shifting the epistemological ground so that (in the words of some of those who have also been critical of the computational turn toward data-led methodologies and who have made a case for the continuing importance of the traditional humanities to the digital humanities), the humanities can push back culturally, as well as intellectually, "against the dominant models of a kind of quantitative and empirical approach," and regain some of their confidence in what they do (Drucker 2010) . 9 Nor of performing quantitative statistical modelling and analysis in a less naïve and more sophisticated manner than has been carried out by many digital humanists to date, with more emphasis being placed on modelling conditions and probabilities than on counting things.
Nor even of harnessing "digital toolkits in the service of the Humanities' core methodological strengths: attention to complexity, medium specificity, historical context, analytical depth, critique and interpretation" (Schnapp and Presner 2011). Instead, the development of such a theory would require opening literary and cultural criticism to disciplines, frameworks and forms of knowledge that are neither close nor distant in their reading practices (Moretti 2000) , methodological nor theoretical, quantitative nor qualitative, deep nor surface, digital nor traditional humanities -nor "humanistic," nor "human," for that matter (Burdick et al 2012, 135, 82) . 10 Rather, they would be, in the words of one twentieth-century commitment to theory, "something else besides;" something that challenges the conventional distinctions between them and, in so doing, "contests the terms and territories of both" (Bhabha 1994, 28 ). What we might perhaps begin to think of as being not just post-digital but posthumanities too.
11 mathematics, and the emphasis he places at the end of The Postmodern Condition on "differential or imaginative or paralogical activity" whose function is to point out "science's presuppositions" and to persuade those involved to "accept different ones" (65). Paralogy, for Lyotard, is thus a form of legitimation "played in the pragmatics of knowledge" (61), admissible because it can "generate ideas"' (65), but distinguishable from innovation on the basis the latter is "under the command of the system, or at least used by it to improve its efficiency" (61). As such, paralogy enables Lyotard to outline a politics that respects both the "desire for the unknown" (67), and "an idea and value of justice that is not linked to that of consensus" (66).
3 As Kirschenbaum writes: "Whatever else it might be then, the digital humanities today is about a scholarship (and a pedagogy) that is publicly visible in ways to which we are generally unaccustomed... Isn't that something you want in your English department?" (2012, 9) .
4 This is one explanation why many exponents of the computational turn appear to display such little awareness of the research of "critical media scholars (like Matthew Fuller, Wendy Chun, McKenzie Wark and many others) and hacker activists of the past decade; research that has shown again and again how these very formalisms [that is "the 'quantitative' formalisms of databases and programming"] are 'qualitative,' i.e. designed by human groups and shaped by cultural, economical and political interests through and through" (Cramer 2009 ). However, it also suggests that those who have called for the development of a more critically engaged digital humanities -informed by the discussions at #transformDH: Transformative Digital Humanities: Doing Race, Ethnicity, Gender, Sexuality and Class in DH, for example (http://transformdh.org/ ) -may be missing the point.
5 Lest this aspect of my analysis appear somewhat unfair, I should stress the ongoing discussion over how the digital humanities are to be defined and understood does feature a number of critics of the turn toward techniques and methodologies derived from computer science who have made a case for the continuing importance of the traditional, theoretically informed humanities. See, in their different ways, not just Higgin (2010) and Liu (2012) , but also Drucker (2010; and Fitzpatrick (2010) .
For an analysis that draws attention to some of the elements of misrecognition that are in turn to be found in such a traditional, theoretically informed humanism, see what follows, including my conclusion; and also Hall (2011) .
endeavour, begun in the eighteenth century, to rationalize the problems presented to governmental practice by the phenomena characteristic of a group of living human beings constituted as a population: health, sanitation, birthrate, longevity, race" (Foucault 1977, 73) . After all, thanks to social media, "for the first time, we can follow imaginations, opinions, ideas, and feelings of hundreds of millions of people" (Manovich 2012a, 461) .
8 Wendy Brown, Judith Butler and Jean-Laplanche, in a passage that was collaboratively written, albeit unintentionally so, put it this way: "Theory is not simply different from description; rather, it is incommensurate with description" (Brown, 2005, 80-81) . 9 For a variation on this theme, see Lovink's argument that:
Digital humanities, with its one-sided emphasis on data visualization, working with computer-illiterate humanities scholars as innocent victims, has so far made a bad start in this respect. We do not need more tools; what's required are large research programs run by technologically informed theorists that finally put critical theory in the driver's seat. The submissive attitude in the arts and humanities towards the hard sciences and industries needs to come to an end. (Lovink 2012) 
